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Self-appointed experts from across the po-
litical spectrum painted Dubai as everything 
from a money-laundering center for Al Qaeda, 
to a shining beacon of cultural tolerance and 
free markets. Those in the business commu-
nity who spend time (and money) there pre-
fer a more succinct description: Dubai Inc.
The actual owner of Dubai Ports World is 
a low-profi le enterprise called simply The Cor-
porate Offi ce, or TCO, a government holding 
company that controls some of Dubai’s most 
profi table assets. TCO is administered by Sheik 
Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum – “Sheik 
Mo” to insiders and “the Boss” to his subjects. 
In effect, TCO is a government entity that 
is run like a private business. And the perfor-
mance of this state-run enterprise (in con-
trast to most others) has been impressive. 
The Dubai airport is the region’s busiest. And 
the Jebel Ali Port and Free Zone, the world’s 
largest man-made port, is buzzing. Emirates 
Airlines, the Dubai state carrier that is the 
region’s largest and most profi table airline, 
It seemed a routine business deal, though surely a large 
one by any standard: P&O Group of Britain (including P&O’s assets in the United 
States) was being acquired by Dubai Ports World, the fast-growing Dubai port oper-
ator, for $6.8 billion. Overnight, the transaction became Topic A in the U.S. Congress 
and Fox News. Dubai, the Persian Gulf destination probably best known in America 
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attracted wide attention in the summer of 
2006 when it announced it was prepared to 
buy British Airways.
A relentless marketing campaign painting 
Dubai as the place to do 
business (and to un-
wind) in the Gulf, is 
supporting an incredi-
ble building boom. In-
deed, roughly one-
quarter of all the cranes 
used in skyscraper con-
struction in the world 
are now said to be at 
work in the tiny coun-
try. Dubai is erecting 
the world’s tallest build-
ing and already has what it 
claims to be the world’s larg-
est shopping mall. In the 
showiest project of all, it is 
dredging some 300 artifi cial islands just off-
shore. These ultra-prime properties form the 
outline of a map of the world and are for sale 
for $6.85 million and (way) up. Richard 
Branson, the billionaire owner of Virgin At-
lantic Airlines and no slouch himself in the 
marketing game, has already staked his claim 
to the Britain-shaped parcel. 
Are we simply watching an accidental 
product of superpower geopolitics riding the 
crest of the oil boom, or is something more 
important going on here? Are there lessons 
applicable to other Arab states seeking to 
make the leap from perpetual tribal confl ict 
to cosmopolitan capitalism? 
birth of a nation 
(city… conglomerate…?)
Dubai Inc. has its roots in its location along 
the Persian Gulf region’s major shipping 
lanes. The trade routes became increasingly 
important in the 19th century, leading Eng-
land to seek control of the ports at the eastern 
end of the Gulf by imposing a series of agree-
ments on the emir of Dubai and neighboring 
tribal rulers. These treaties designated 
the largely Sunni Arab sheikdoms 
(Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, 
Umm al Qaywayn, Ras al Khaymah 
and Al Fujayrah) as Trucial States 
that were under the protection of the 
British Navy. The result was rel-
ative security, but isola-
tion from the evolving 
modernization and na-
tionalism of the region.
Dubai, a bit of a mav-
erick within the group, 
developed a reputation 
as a hustling regional 
entrepôt. It had always 
possessed one advantage 
over the other Trucial sheikdoms: a better 
natural port. And this asset was complement-
ed by its rulers’ enthusiasm for foreign trade 
– especially compared with nearby Abu Dhabi, 
whose cautious rulers restricted entry even by 
merchants from other Trucial States.
In the decades before World War II, Dubai 
also fl ourished as a center for fi shing, pearl 
diving and gold crafting. Its exports of pearls 
and gold attracted traders (and smugglers) 
from around the Gulf. As a result, Dubai de-
veloped a reputation for wide-open com-
merce. Then, in 1968, Britain set a three-year 
timetable for terminating its protection of the 
Trucial States as part of a broader move to re-
duce entanglements in the Middle East. It en-
couraged the little sheikdoms to form a fed-
eration, whose 1971 constitution became the 
foundation for the United Arab Emirates. 
Along with designating Abu Dhabi as the cap-
ital, the constitution divided responsibilities 
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between individual emirates and the new fed-
eral government. 
While the UAE’s national government has 
jurisdiction over the currency, foreign policy 
and defense, the rulers of each emirate retain 
absolute authority within their borders that 
gives them wide discretion in development 
strategies. Specifi cally, each emirate controls 
its own oil production and resource develop-
ment. For example, although Abu Dhabi 
joined OPEC in 1967 (four years before the 
UAE was formed), Dubai does not consider 
itself to be part of OPEC or to be bound by its 
cartel quota. 
The glue holding the UAE together is the 
vast oil wealth beneath Abu Dhabi, which 
gives the capital the capacity to underwrite 
much of the federal budget. Unlike the other 
emirates, though, Dubai struck out early on 
its own path, playing the entrepreneur to Abu 
Dhabi’s oil rentier – albeit with consent (and 
substantial subsidies) from its richer neigh-
bor. Dubai’s own oil production now hovers 
somewhere below 200,000 barrels a day, and 
its reserves are expected to be exhausted with-
in 10 years. 
dubai’s adoption of 
the singapore model
Shortly before Dubai’s entry into the federa-
tion, the emirate’s rulers had begun to build 
aggressively on its long tradition of open 
commerce. They focused on developing a 
base for diversifi ed growth by fi rst investing 
in major infrastructure. Since oil revenues 
had not yet begun to fl ow into the emirate, 
Dubai’s ruler at the time, Sheik Rashid Al 
Maktoum, borrowed heavily from Kuwait to 
fi nance the expansion of the port through the 
dredging of what is known as Dubai Creek. 
As a result, larger ships were able to dock in 
Dubai. To the same general end, he author-
ized the construction of a modern jetport.
Early on, then, Dubai’s economic strategy 
was built on: (a) open trade and unrestricted 
capital outfl ows, (b) a lightly regulated econ-
omy with low taxes, (c) the best infrastructure 
that government money could buy, and (d) 
unregulated labor markets. Sheik Rashid 
plowed the fi rst gush of oil revenue (which 
began in the 1970s) into expanding Dubai’s 
Port Rashid. He also used oil money to invest 
in desalinization plants and an aluminum in-
dustry (Dubai Aluminum) that could take 
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otherwise go to waste.
Rashid’s diversifi cation drive continued 
with Dubai’s dramatic entry into tourism in 
the 1980s. Rashid promoted Emirates Airlines 
as a luxurious alternative to other airlines’ fl y-
ing sardine tins. “Free zones” were developed, 
offering a liberal business environment in-
cluding the right to 100 percent foreign own-
ership, freedom from corporate tax and zero 
restrictions on the repatriation of profi ts. As a 
result, Dubai became a large re-export hub 
and an attractive base for fi nance and tech-
nology companies doing business in the Mid-
dle East, Africa and South Asia. 
After Sheik Rashid’s death in 1990, his son, 
Sheik Mohammed, continued Dubai’s go-go 
development strategy. He raised the promo-
tional ante by establishing sporting events, in-
cluding the Dubai Desert Classic Golf Tourna-
ment (the top prize of $400,000 went to Tiger 
Woods this year), along with distractions like 
the Dubai Shopping Festival (the city boasts 
25 shopping malls). Additionally, he initiated 
construction of the “seven-star” Burj Al Arab 
hotel (rates start at $900 a night), whose sail-
shaped silhouette quickly became Dubai’s 
symbol for over-the-top consumerism. All 
the hype seems to have worked: tourism is the 
economy’s leading growth sector. 
Dubai also began to position itself as a re-
gional center for fi nance. Construction is 
under way on the Dubai International Finan-
cial Center, which its leaders hope will allow 
Dubai to expand its role in regional banking.
The development model of Singapore has 
had a great infl uence on Dubai’s leaders. And 
the appeal is understandable. Like Singapore 
(and in contrast to Hong Kong and Taiwan), 
Dubai aspires to state-led capitalism as op-
posed to pure laissez-faire. Just as Singapore 
nurtured business champions, including Sin-
gapore Airlines and DBS Bank, Dubai’s devel-
opment was led by Emirates Airlines and 
Dubai Aluminum. 
Singapore’s ability to integrate and execute 
policies across multiple agencies by concen-
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trating decision-making in the hands of a few 
also attracted Dubai Inc.’s bosses. So, too, has 
Singapore’s strategy of luring multinationals 
with fi nancial incentives, and tackling labor 
shortages with targeted guest-worker pro-
grams. Arguably most important, Dubai’s 
hands-on leaders identify with Sing apore’s 
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through heavy investment in education and 
sponsorship of technology clusters. 
There are major differences, however, be-
tween the two development models. Whereas 
Singapore’s strategy came out of a belief that 
the city-state could not survive without rapid 
growth, Dubai’s starting point is the need to 
replace declining oil revenues. Moreover, the 
reality that Dubai’s work force is less skilled 
has limited the degree to which the Gulf state 
can emulate Singapore’s leap to modernity.
Both Dubai and Singapore draw on key el-
ements of Harvard Business School guru Mi-
chael Porter’s growth framework, which em-
phasizes entrepreneurship and innovation as 
central to the creation of national advantage. 
For Porter and Dubai Inc., the key to growth 
is the way in which successful industries clus-
ter in mutually reinforcing ways, both verti-
cally (suppliers and fi nal goods producers) 
and horizontally (common customers, shared 
technology, infrastructure). This framework 
lends itself to strategies that strive to create 
“virtuous circles” – that is, environments in 
which activity in one area stimulates invest-
ment and production in others. 
In Singapore, government-fi nanced infra-
structure and open trade zones were used to 
attract multinationals. After locating there, 
these companies both stimulated growth in 
indigenous suppliers and served as a magnet 
for new foreign businesses that eventually es-
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Dubai has employed a parallel strategy to 
attract multinationals. In turn, the presence 
of these companies increased the demand for 
hotels, restaurants and real estate, while si-
multaneously raising the emirate’s interna-
tional profi le as a good place to work and 
play. This virtuous circle has been going on 
for at least a decade and has produced re-
markable results by Middle Eastern stan-
dards. Since 1995, Dubai’s economy has 
grown by more than 6 percent annually – 
quite an achievement in a region buffeted by 
the rise of Al Qaeda, the American invasion of 
Iraq, the second Palestinian intifada and open 
confl ict between Sunnis and Shiites. 
A number of differences between the de-
velopment strategies in Dubai and Singapore 
are worth noting. Singapore’s approach has 
been technocratic, while Dubai’s leaders have 
played hunches rather than playing by the 
book. Private businesses would never have 
come up with projects as risky and ambitious 
as dredging the Dubai Creek to create a 
world-class port or building the world’s tall-
est building on the faith that if it was built, 
tenants would come.
In fact, Singapore could learn a few lessons 
from Dubai in calculated risk-taking. The 
emirate has already overtaken Singapore in a 
few areas – especially in selling itself to the 
world as a trendy place to spend money and 
do business. In fact, Dubai has managed to 
build a reputation as being open to new ideas, 
in contrast to Singapore’s rigidity. 
dubai’s synergy with abu dhabi
While Dubai is, for good reasons, bent on eco-
nomic diversifi cation, the United Arab Emir-
ates’ capital has had the luxury of relying on 
huge energy reserves to ease its way into mo-
dernity. But natural resource exploitation can 
be a trap, albeit one lined in silk. Abu Dhabi’s 
share of the UAE’s gross domestic product 
fell from 61.9 percent in 2000 to 58.5 percent 
in 2004, even as oil prices went through the 
roof. By contrast, Dubai’s share of the emir-
ates’ total GDP increased to 26 percent from 
24.2 percent during the same period. 
Dubai has been similarly successful in at-
tracting foreign direct investment, a key to 
enduring growth. It ranks fi rst among the 
emirates, with 54 percent of all foreign invest-
ment in the UAE’s non-oil-related manufac-
turing sector. Abu Dhabi is fourth.
Paradoxically, the differences may serve 
the emirates’ collective interests. Most oil-rich 
developing countries are underperformers 
across a wide spectrum of economic, social, 
political and governance standards. In coun-
tries ranging from Iran to Venezuela to Indo-
nesia, following the path of least political re-
sistance has meant stagnation outside the oil 
economy. The federal nature of the UAE, by 
contrast, allows for bold entrepreneurship in 
one city and a (relatively benign) rentier 
economy in another city just two hours down 
the road.
The whole has proved greater than the 
sum of the parts. Moreover, there is every in-
dication this synergy will endure. Abu Dhabi 
is likely to stay the course on its long-term 
strategy of leveraging the development of 
heavy industry on rich reserves of oil and gas. 
Dubai, for its part, will use its reputation as a 
Dubai, for its part, 
will use its reputation 
as a dependable oasis in 
an undependable region 
to build a prosperous 
entrepôt state.
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dependable oasis in an undependable region 
to build a prosperous entrepôt state.
possible complications
What could go wrong? First, as the Dubai 
Ports World fi asco demonstrated, Dubai car-
ries perceptual baggage that constrains its 
ability to participate in lucrative international 
ventures. Many view the emirate as a murky 
bazaar of money laundering and arms traf-
fi cking. And that is not entirely unfair: Dubai 
has long been a crossroads of trade, barter 
and informal cash transfers that have been 
linked to terrorist groups. In recent years, 
Dubai’s traders have earned international ill 
will by helping expatriates from India by-
pass that country’s ban on gold futures trad-
ing. Dubai traders have also helped to launder 
consumer goods bound for Iran in violation 
of United States economic sanctions.
The hope is that, with time, the emirate 
will gain both the will and the ways to control 
the less savory aspects of its economy. Indeed, 
there have already been some signs of prog-
ress on the governance front. The UAE has 
improved its World Bank rankings in the key 
areas of government effectiveness, regulatory 
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Unfortunately, in the key area of “voice and 
accountability,” the UAE still lags far behind 
its city-state rivals Hong Kong and Singapore.
For some time, the powerful inner circle 
controlling Dubai Inc. proved to be highly ef-
fective and motivated, in contrast to the orga-
nized crime syndicates that dominate most of 
the region’s other oil-based economies. As the 
economy has matured, however, it has be-
come increasingly complex. As a result, it has 
become ever harder for the ruler and his close 
allies to anticipate Dubai’s needs and deliver 
remedies. 
Confl icts of interest are also appearing 
that may mean that what is best for Dubai 
Inc. is no longer best for the population at 
large. This is illustrated most vividly by the 
government’s approach to the Dubai’s trans-
port system.
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traffi c in this city of 1.1 million has led to se-
rious rush-hour snarls. Many analysts fear 
that the congestion will soon become a drag 
on growth in Dubai, signifi cantly adding to 
the cost of doing business. Now, a primary 
cause of these traffi c snarls is the daily infl ux 
of labor from the neighboring emirate of 
Sharjah (population: 700,000), where hous-
ing is cheaper. The traffi c problem could eas-
ily be fi xed with more roads. Dubai’s authori-
ties have reportedly refused to do the job, 
however, apparently because easier transit be-
tween emirates would raise property values in 
Sharjah and lower them in Dubai. And the 
fortunes of Dubai’s ruling elite are now close-
ly aligned with the local real estate market. 
The population of Dubai is projected to 
double to 2.1 million in 2010, while visitors 
are expected to increase to 15 million annually 
within a decade. The lack of affordable hous-
ing is already impeding worker recruitment. 
And with commercial rents also on the rise, 
some fi rms are moving from Dubai or at least 
considering moves to neighboring Gulf states. 
The danger for Dubai is that these bottle-
necks are beginning to undermine its business 
model. Although the model is not based on 
Dubai’s being the cheapest place to do busi-
ness in the region, rapid rises in costs hardly 
serve the emirate’s long-term goal of becom-
ing another Singapore. And, more insidiously, 
high costs chip away at Dubai’s efforts to dif-
ferentiate itself through quality of life. 
Note, too, that Dubai’s increasing depen-
Dubai’s increasing dependence on tourism renders it 











15Fourth Quarter  2006 
dence on tourism renders it extremely vul-
nerable to terrorist attacks. And, as violence 
in Qatar – most notably the suicide bombing 
of a theater – demonstrated, terrorists are 
now going after “soft targets” that symbolize 
Western infl uence as well as more obvious 
targets like Americans in Iraq and security 
forces in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, authorities in 
Dubai have successfully foiled several terror-
ism attempts in recent years, including one in 
which explosives were placed in a popular 
shopping mall.
If terrorists get luckier or simply more de-
termined, Dubai could lose those deep-pock-
eted tourists. By the same token, terrorism 
could cause a capital outfl ow similar to the 
outfl ows suffered by Kuwait and Bahrain in 
the 1990s – outfl ows that contributed to 
Dubai’s rise as a regional business center.
last thoughts
The wealth created by the world-class fi rms 
attracted to the emirate proves that Dubai 
Inc. is much more than a mirage. Whether 
Dubai Inc. is a paradigm for other Arab coun-
tries, though, is another question. While the 
emirate’s history, geographic setting and fed-
eration with a major oil supplier set it apart 
from most other countries in the region (and 
even from other entrepôt states like Singa-
pore and Hong Kong) some aspects of its eco-
nomic strategy could be fruitfully adopted by 
other countries in the region. In particular, 
policymakers would do well to emulate 
Dubai’s determined effort to integrate with 
the global economy. 
A series of extravagant initiatives has en-
abled Dubai to reinvent itself when necessary 
to maintain growth. But a close look suggests 
the emirate has been incredibly lucky as well 
as smart – hitting hot oil markets at just the 
right time, while reaping benefi ts as a safe 
place to play in an ever more dangerous re-
gion. Indeed, the recent Hezbollah-Israel con-
frontation in Lebanon will no doubt divert 
many tourists to Dubai. 
The new skittishness in the Dubai Stock 
Exchange – in early 2006 stocks lost half their 
value from the 2005 peak – suggests more 
than one investor is having doubts about the 
impermeability of the emirate’s Tefl on coat-
ing, however. Moreover, as other out-of-the-
line-of-fi re Gulf countries begin to compete 
for tourism and foreign business on Dubai’s 
terms, the going is bound to get rougher.
Dubai may be a home away from home for 
Michael Jackson, Richard Branson, David 
Beckham and Michael Schumacher. And it 
certainly has earned its reputation as a place 
where celebrities can misbehave without con-
sequences: In July, Senator Orrin G. Hatch of 
Utah wangled a pardon for the music produc-
er Dallas Austin after he was caught carrying 
cocaine on his way to visit the supermodel 
Naomi Campbell. But Dubai’s success in 
playing host to a community that lives and 
breathes fantasy doesn’t, alas, guarantee that 
it will never come face to face with Middle 
East realities. M
And as the recent bombing in Qatar demonstrated, 
terrorists are now going after “soft targets” 
that symbolize Western influence as well as more 
obvious targets like Americans in Iraq.
